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Objectives. The number of countries reporting dengue cases is increasing worldwide. Nepal saw its first dengue outbreak in
2010, with 96% of cases reported in three districts. There are numerous policy challenges to providing an effective public
health response system in a fragile state. This paper evaluates the dengue case notification, surveillance, laboratory facilities,
intersectoral collaboration, and how government and community services responded to the outbreak. Methods. Qualitative data
were collected through 20 in-depth interviews, with key stakeholders, and two focus-group discussions, with seven participants.
Results. Limitations of case recognition included weak diagnostic facilities and private hospitals not incorporated into the case
reporting system. Research on vectors was weak, with no virological surveillance. Limitations of outbreak response included poor
coordination and an inadequate budget. There was good community mobilization and emergency response but no routine vector
control. Conclusions. A weak state has limited response capabilities. Disease surveillance and response plans need to be country-
specific and consider state response capacity and the level of endemicity. Two feasible solutions for Nepal are (1) go upwards to
regional collaboration for disease and vector surveillance, laboratory assistance, and staff training; (2) go downwards to expand
upon community mobilisation, ensuring that vector control is anticipatory to outbreaks.
1. Introduction
Dengue is the most important vector-borne viral infection
worldwide with 2.5 billion people at risk, according to the
World Health Organisation (WHO) [1]. The number of cases
and number of countries affected has doubled from the
period 1990–1994 to 2000–2004 [1–3]. Larger epidemics are
becoming more common [4], with countries in Asia witness-
ing an increase in severe dengue and a higher mortality in the
earlier stages [5].
Nepal reported its first case of dengue in 2004 and
the first indigenous case in 2006 [6]. Only sporadic cases
were then seen until the outbreak in 2010, with 917 cases
reported nationally (unpublished data), seen almost solely in
3 administrative districts in the Terai region on the Indian
border: Chitwan, Nawalparasi, and Rupandehi. The aim of
this paper is to describe the public health surveillance and
outbreak response to dengue in Nepal in 2010 and to draw
lessons from the experience of a fragile state.
The WHOWorld Health Assembly urged member states
to improve surveillance, prevention, control, and manage-
ment of dengue [7]. Guidelines highlight the need to incor-
porate lessons learnt from country experiences into outbreak
response plans [1]. Country responses to dengue have been
documented from all around the world [8]; however, little
published literature is available in countries which have seen
a recent introduction of dengue viruses, such as Nepal. This
research seeks to address the gap.
The “Early Warning Reporting System” (EWARS) in
Nepal was set up in 1997 with eight hospital sentinel sites
rising to 39 hospital sentinel sites by 2011. There are six tar-
geted diseases/syndromes: malaria, kala-azar, dengue fever,
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acute gastroenteritis, cholera, and severe acute respiratory
infection. Nepal is a postconflict fragile state, a term used “for
countries facing particularly severe development challenges:
weak institutional capacity, poor governance and political
instability” [9]. Nepal faces many challenges in healthcare
provision including weak, poorly structured healthcare ser-
vices with financial and human resource limitations [10,
11]. Looking through the lens of dengue helps identify the
key strengths and weaknesses in the public health system
in the context of a fragile state. This paper focuses on
dengue case notification, surveillance, laboratory facilities,
intersectoral collaboration, and how government services
and the community responded to the dengue outbreak.
2. Methodology
The study aims to describe the good practices and limiting
factors of the surveillance “recognition” system and the inter-
sectoral “response” to dengue.
2.1. Data Collection Tools and Sampling. Qualitative data
collection tools were used to analyse the dengue outbreak
response. Participants were sampled purposively, with delib-
erate selection regarding their experience, to help ensure
involvement of the key stakeholders in the dengue surveil-
lance and outbreak response, including government policy-
makers, officials from three key districts, healthcare workers
and community leaders. This range of perspectives ensures
fair dealing, improving the quality of the data. A list of all
government and district officials and healthcare providers
involved with the dengue surveillance and outbreak response
was compiled with help from Epidemiology and Disease
Control Division (EDCD) and Public Health and Infectious
Disease Research Centre inNepal—this became the sampling
frame. Further participants were added to this by snowball
sampling. Table 1 identifies the number and roles of the
participants. All central officials involved with dengue were
included plus district officials from the 3 districts most
affected, Chitwan, Nawalparasi, and Rupandehi. Doctors
from the central level and all three districts that hadmanaged
dengue cases were included. Other districts with few cases
were excluded (<4% of total dengue cases). Community
leaders available for focus groups discussions (FGDs) were
identified with district officials. Contact was made with each
person involved via phone or in person. The sample size
took into account the saturation principle; data collection
was deemed sufficient when new data did not provide new
information or ideas on the topics being questioned.
2.2. Data Collection. In-depth interviews and focus group
discussions were used for data collection. These were con-
ducted four to five months after the outbreak had subsided.
2.2.1. In-Depth Interviews. Twenty in-depth interviews
explored the experiences, successes, and failures of the
recognition of dengue cases and response to the outbreak.The
brief topic guide used is shown below. This was elaborated
on, allowing flexible questioning and exploration of issues
raised.
(i) Recognition of the Dengue Cases
(a) Which disease surveillance techniques are used
and how data surveillance is analysed?
(b) How is dengue classified?
(c) How are dengue cases reported?
(d) The laboratory confirmation available.
(e) Collecting data for virological surveillance and
its use.
(f) Vector surveillance—what surveys are done?
(ii) Response to the Dengue Outbreak
(a) Vector control—how is this done and by whom?
(b) Community participation—towhat extent is the
community involved and how?
(c) Preparing for a dengue outbreak—is there a
plan?
(d) Recent experience with a dengue outbreak.
(e) Which sectors and organisations were involved
with outbreak response, including training and
measures used?
(f) Budget.
2.2.2. Focus Group Discussion. A larger FGD was run with
five doctors in a district hospital. A small focus group was
held with community leaders.
2.3. Data Analysis. Qualitative data collected through in-
depth interviews and FGDs were transcribed, coded, and
analysed using NVIVO software.
2.4. Ethical Aspects. Each participant provided informed
consent for data collection and recordings. The research
received ethical approval from the Liverpool School of Tropi-
cal Medicine and the Nepal Health Research Council (Refer-
ence no. 981, 2011).
3. Results
Tables 2 and 3 summarise the main activities and limitations
regarding dengue outbreak detection and response described
by participants, alongside potential recommendations sug-
gested.
3.1. Recognition of the Dengue Cases. Guidelines on the
dengue surveillance system and dengue clinical management
were available but there were no other public health guide-
lines. With one exception, all respondents recognised that
dengue reporting was mandatory.
Sentinel site surveillance was identified as the principal
surveillance method by 9 respondents. Ten respondents
noted that active surveillance was undertaken; however it
became clear from the interviews that this only occurred
during an outbreak.
“We have active data collection, only in case of
outbreak” (Government Official, Identifier 9).
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Table 1: Number and role of participants involved in each component of the research.
Component of study Number ofparticipants Role of participants
In-depth interview evaluating
dengue response 20
6 government officials, 2 entomologists, 9 district officials (from District Public
Health Office, subhealth posts, vector control inspector, malaria worker,
municipality officer), 1 central level physician, 2 district level physicians
Focus-group discussion with
hospital staff 1 group of 5 5 district level clinicians
Small discussion with
community/FCHV 1 group of 2 1 community leader, 1 healthcare worker
Total number of participants Total: 27
Table 2: Dengue surveillance: activities and limitations.
Key component of
recognition of dengue
cases∗
Extent to which activities were undertaken in Nepal in
2010 Reasons for problems identified and how to improve
Guidelines on dengue
disease notification
used
National clinical management guidelines available. Did
not include guidelines on public health response.
Dengue not previously identified as a public health
priority. New guidelines were commissioned in 2011.
Active and passive
data collection
Sentinel site surveillance, only 39 sites. Not in all
districts. Did not include private hospitals. Not
representative of country population.
Limited funds available for widespread surveillance.
Active data collection
during outbreak
Fever surveillance only occurred during the outbreak in
two districts.
Well-defined
indicators for a
dengue outbreak
Well-defined outbreak threshold: one or more dengue
cases reported in nonendemic districts or five or more
cases in endemic districts. Poor case definition of
dengue.
Standard national guidelines available for dengue case
definition but not consistently applied by participants.
Linking surveillance
to response activities
EDCD collects and analyses the data and coordinate
response measures. Poor coordination between central
and periphery, confusion over which agency was in
charge. No continuity of response.
Need better coordination with district offices to
improve response time. Municipality meetings planned.
Training on
surveillance
Despite 9 participants noted that training on
surveillance was available, this was very limited and
described as “not functioning at present.”
Internet-based reporting had been introduced but
training not provided.
More in-depth training requested by participants.
Dengue as a notifiable
disease
Dengue is one of 6 notifiable diseases through the Early
Warning and Response System in Nepal.
Clinicians are inexperienced with dengue and need to
consider it as a differential of fever.
Appropriate level of
financial resources Budget was deemed insufficient by all participants.
Appropriate level of
human resources
More hospitals and staff need to be included in the
surveillance system.
Viral surveillance Unable to undertake viral surveillance. Facilities for PCR should be made available in Nepal.
Laboratory
diagnostics-
serological and
virological
Serological tests (IgG/IgM, either RDT or ELISA) were
used for diagnosis. ELISA available in “five or six
centres only.” Only one participant had access to PCR
(not available in general public or private facilities).
Lack of regional facilities identified as key limitation.
Concern over accuracy of RDT kits.
Quality control of
diagnostics. No systematic measurement.
Introduce regional laboratory facilities to allow quality
control.
Monitoring of
environmental risk
factors
Rainfall, temperature, and housing conditions not
systematically linked into dengue surveillance system.
∗Source of key component: WHO 2009 [1].
EDCD: Epidemiology and Disease Control Division, Kathmandu, RDT: rapid diagnostic test, PCR: polymerase chain reaction, and ELISA: enzyme-linked
immunosorbent assay kit.
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Table 3: Dengue outbreak response: activities and limitations.
Key component of
vector control
activities∗
Extent to which activities were undertaken in Nepal in
2010 Reasons for problems identified and how to improve
Entomological
surveillance
Limited—few surveys were undertaken in 2006 and
one in 2010 at the beginning of the outbreak, only 122
houses included in one municipality.
Due to poor human resource capacity, only two
entomologists in Nepal.
Routine search and
destroy of vector
habitats campaign
Not in place. No routine vector control. Dengue new and emerging, not previously seen as athreat. Coordination poor in 2010.
Emergency search
and destroy of vector
habitats campaign
Well run programme through community mobilisation,
particularly in Chitwan and Rupandehi. Community
received programme well. Not in all vulnerable areas.
Expand programmes to more vulnerable areas.
Awareness campaign
Thorough programme run by district public health
office and good role of the media.
Not enough IEC materials and reactive rather than
anticipatory.
Need to ensure that awareness campaign is started
earlier, before rainy season. Plans to include
schoolchildren in future campaigns.
Water treatment by
insecticide Not done in Nepal. Insecticides not available.
Insecticide treated
nets
Not utilised in Nepal. Some nontreated nets available
through malaria programme. Funds not available.
Fogging (insecticide
spraying in public
areas from vehicles)
Undertaken in some districts in Nepal. Repeated
several times as high public demand.
Contentious issue over effectiveness. Educate
community over low effectiveness. Need advice from
other organisations to maximise effectiveness.
Water container
covers
Widespread use in Nepal, part of search and destroy
and education campaign.
Improvement of water
supply and sanitation
Not done in Nepal. Poor coordination with district
office and WASH cluster.
Interagency
coordination
“Multisectoral
Dengue Action
Committee” setup
Poor. No NGO/INGO collaboration. Poor link and slow
communication between central and periphery.
Meetings held with central level and municipality, little
evidence of further multisectoral action.
More municipality meetings planned.
∗Source of key component: WHO 2009 [1].
IEC: information, education, communication;WASH cluster: water, sanitation, and hygiene sector; NGO/INGO: nongovernmental organisation/international
nongovernmental organization.
Eight out of 17 respondents noted that fever surveillance
was undertaken. Nine participants noted that there was focal
surveillance (active case detection around reported cases).
However this only happened in two of the districts during the
outbreak, not routinely.
There were concerns that this surveillance system is inad-
equate. One respondent reported that “we are only touching
the tip of the iceberg” as many fever cases will not present
to hospital, and there may be “hundreds of thousands of
dengue cases” in the community (Doctor in District Hospital,
Identifier 16).
Furthermore, quality control of disease surveillance was
insufficient.
“We do not say if the data is accurate or not.
We just analyse which hospitals, which sentinel
sites send the data and how many cases are there”
(Government Official, Identifier 9).
The late recognition of dengue cases by the government
was noted to be the primary limitation.There is poor linkage
of private sector hospitals into the national reporting system.
“Most people go to [the] private sector. . . but they
do not record or report properly. And less people go
to visit the government clinics but there is a good
system of recording.”
District Official, Identifier 22
The main method of classifying dengue cases was the
“DF/DHF/DSS” system (according to 14 participants who
knew about classification). However, the majority of these
participants (10 out of these 14) were aware of the revised
WHO dengue case classification [1]. A national case defini-
tion of dengue is available, but clinicians did not consistently
apply this, with a variety of answers provided when asked to
state this definition.
Viral surveillance was not available in Nepal. A Govern-
ment official said:
“Somany samples were collected here, [we] cannot
identify the types of virus involved. We do not
have the facility for virus isolation” (Government
Official, Identifier 24).
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3.1.1. Laboratory Diagnostics. Interviews with healthcare
workers and the laboratory technician highlighted that the
main diagnostic tools were haematological and clinical find-
ings alongside serological diagnosis (rapid diagnosis test
(RDT) orMACELISA (IgM antibody capture enzyme-linked
immunosorbent assay kit)). Only one participant had access
to polymerase chain reaction (PCR) privately, which was not
otherwise available. The lack of facilities within Nepal was
identified as a key limitation by both government and clinical
staff as ELISA tests were not available countrywide.
On analysis of secondary government data, at least 803
out of the 917 dengue cases nationwide were confirmed by
IgG/IgM tests (either RDT or ELISA, not specified). There
was a variation in the proportion of cases confirmed by the
laboratory, with participants noting that between 10 and 50%
of dengue cases were confirmed.
Regional healthcare centres relied on less specific and
sensitive RDTs which were in short supply.
“During the last season the government provided
around 100 [RDT] kits in our hospital, and 100 kits
will finish in one day.We seemore than 200 people
in one day!”
(Clinician, District Level, Identifier 20).
3.1.2. Budget. According to a senior health official, the overall
budget for all dengue activities was $70’000 (US dollars)
in 2010. These funds were used for the provision of RDT
kits, orientation (one day training given to staff), and case
management training. The central government provided all
funds with no external assistance. Hence an “insufficient
budget” at the district level was identified as the “main
problem” (District official, Identifier 10).
3.2. Response
3.2.1. Vector Surveillance before and during the Outbreak.
Vector surveillance was poor, with no routine entomological
surveys. Furthermore, these surveys were not conducted
countrywide. One entomologist (Identifier 4) admitted that
there were methodological weaknesses with “no sampling
method.” The latest survey from 2010 was small and only
examined 122 houses in onemunicipality. Respondents noted
that this deficiency was due to “a lack of human resources”
(Government Official, Identifier 6) and training.
3.2.2. Routine and Emergency Search and Destroy Campaigns.
All vector control measures were done exclusively as an
emergency response once the outbreak had started.
“No experience among our health workers and
local people [meant that] it took some time to
realise this was not a disease but a disaster type of
disease. It took two months to realise [that it was
an outbreak of dengue]” (Government Official,
Identifier 2).
Key emergency vector control activities included com-
munity education and awareness campaigns, clean-up cam-
paigns, environmental habitat destruction (“search and
Search and
destroy, 5
Door-to-door
awareness, 7
Media
awareness, 1
Fogging, 1
Figure 1: What was the most successful measure in the outbreak
response? (Number of participants.) Responses of 14 Key respon-
dents.
destroy” campaigns), and insecticide space spraying (fog-
ging).
According to participants (Figure 1), the most successful
response measures were the door-to-door awareness cam-
paigns and the search and destroy campaign, which were
run simultaneously by Female Community Health Volun-
teers (FCHVs). This included demonstrating the destruction
of vector habitats and the use of water container covers.
Furthermore, one respondent identified these FCHVs as the
strongest partners in the outbreak response as “community
people believe them more than others” (District Official,
Identifier 19).
No respondent noted water treatment by insecticides or
that insecticide-treated nets were in use.Therewas no process
employed to improve water protection or cleaning. Despite
recognising that fogging “adversely affects our health” (District
official, Identifier 10), it was still employed by district officials
due to public demand.
3.3. Intersectoral Cooperation and Coordination during the
Outbreak. The emergency response was a good example of
good intersectoral collaboration with many sectors being
involved:
“. . .hospitals as well as civil society, administra-
tions, security forces, all sector people helped, even
housewives, schoolchildren, market people, busi-
ness people. . .” (Government Official, Identifier
9).
However there was poor coordination between the cen-
tral level and the periphery. There was confusion over which
agency was in charge of vector control. Nine respondents
thought that the district public health offices were in charge,
six thought that the central level staff and one person thought
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the Vector borne disease research and training centre were
in charge. The need for better coordination was recognised
and plans to “conduct an annual meeting of municipalities”
(District Official, Identifier 14) were in place.
The media played a strong role in the outbreak; 16
respondents first heard about the outbreak through television
or newspaper.
4. Discussion
The study findings demonstrate the extensive limitations
existing in a fragile state that need to be addressed before and
during a dengue outbreak in order to provide reliable dengue
surveillance data and an adequate response in accordance
with international dengue guidelines. Overall the response
to dengue was lacking in numerous areas, such as disease
surveillance, but was strong with respect to community
participation and themedia.Themain issues encountered are
discussed as follows.
4.1. Dengue and Disease Surveillance
4.1.1. Case Notification. Good case notification relies on three
key components: an accurate case definition, reliable diag-
nostic facilities, and quality control to assess the data. Case
definition needs to be specific and applied consistently to pre-
vent under-/overreporting of the epidemic andmisdiagnosis.
The majority of reported cases in Nepal were confirmed by
IgG/IgM tests demonstrating that the outbreak data is valid.
However, some respondents thought that up to 90% of poten-
tial dengue cases were not confirmed by a laboratory test.
There may be a large number of potential cases undetected
in the community, demonstrating the underrepresentation of
true epidemic figures.
Dengue guidelines state that as a minimum, laboratories
should be able to perform IgM antibody-capture ELISA
[1]. Relying on clinical and haematological features for a
diagnosis can lead to a delay in laboratory diagnosis and
response time. This weakness of diagnostics only available at
central level has been documented in other countries such as
Brazil [12]. Although, it is important to consider the context,
improving access to reliable RDT kits across the country
may be a practical alternative to providing more expensive
facilities.
4.1.2. Disease Surveillance. Various limitations of the surveil-
lance systems can be highlighted. Active case detection, to
complement passive surveillance, was only undertaken in
two districts. Widespread active surveillance needs to be put
in place to help predict future epidemics [13]. Surveillance
should be continuous to collect information on the origin and
distribution of dengue cases; helping to estimate incidence
and allowing services to prepare.
Sentinel surveillance can help determine transmission
dynamics of infectious diseases; however as the sites only
represent a specific cohort and not the general population,
they cannot be used alone to ascertain national trends [1].
Thirty-nine sites in Nepal were apparently too few in such a
diverse country with distinct terrains to detect the outbreak
in a timely manner.
Private hospitals not being properly integrated in the
surveillance system were a key cause of notification delay,
generally a problem in Nepal [11]. Many dengue patients in
the high risk areas utilised private healthcare services—
for example, 324 out of 592 dengue patients recorded in
Chitwan/Nawalparasi were seen in just one private hospital.
Studies from South East Asia have highlighted the under-
reported burden of dengue fromhospital case reporting, with
the average underrecognition of total dengue cases 8.7-fold
in Thailand and 9.1-fold in Cambodia [14]. Hence, primary
healthcare centres should be included in the surveillance
system, as recommended previously in 2004 [15]. FCHVs are
an effective part of the district healthcare system and should
be better incorporated into the reporting system.
Any changes in the surveillance system must recog-
nise the cost and resource limitations. Including dengue
surveillance as part of an integrated system for other vector-
borne diseases may reduce costs and staffing. Although
active surveillance increases the sensitivity of a surveillance
system, it places huge demands on resources. Only Cuba and
Singapore utilise a regular countrywide active surveillance
programme [16]. There is little information on cost effec-
tiveness of surveillance programmes and this needs to be
addressed.
4.1.3. Vector Surveillance. There is a huge research gap on
vectors in Nepal, particularly with up-to-date dengue vector
surveillance and control. Nepal cannot combat dengue with-
out information on the vectors present, their spatial distri-
bution, and environmental risk factors. Nepal has numerous
other vector-borne and infectious diseases to contend with,
for example, updating 40-year-old data on malaria preva-
lence. However, dengue should be a priority as new research
could help prepare integrated response measures to mitigate
the impact of future outbreaks.
Regional collaboration with neighbouring countries
endemic for dengue, such as India, may facilitate this vector
research through cost and expertise efficiencies, helping to
implement a cross-border disease and virological surveilla-
nce programme and to provide comprehensive training.
As another arboviral disease, a cross-border virological
surveillance programme that includes Japanese encephalitis
may prove beneficial for disease monitoring and research
purposes.
4.2. Response to Dengue Outbreaks
4.2.1. Community Participation. The success of the awareness
programmes and search and destroy campaigns can be
attributed to excellent communitymobilisation. Conflictmay
have had positive effects on health services in Nepal, notably
helping to acknowledge community groups and civil society
in health programmes [17]. This is in contrast to other
literature which notes that mobilisation may not be suitable
for communities in conflict [18]. However, evidence shows
how conflict encouraged the development of community
support programmes and FCHV involvement [19].
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There aremany reasons for building upon this good social
mobilisation. Evidence suggests that community participa-
tion is vital in an outbreak response, both with dengue for
vector control and reducing larval indices and with other
vector-borne diseases [8, 20, 21]. However, a comprehensive
review calls for better documentation of the successes of com-
munity participation, with weak evidence that the strategies
have an effect on dengue transmission [20]. Future research
needs to look at statistical evidence.
Both awareness and search and destroy programmes need
to be routine, utilising community mobilisation and incor-
porating dengue in current job titles within the local district
public health offices. Improvements in community participa-
tion should incorporate all areas vulnerable to dengue, not
just selecting few districts. Sustainability of the programmes
needs to be guaranteed and the community should be
involved with decision-making. A more formal community
coordination group needs to be created between different sec-
tors such as water and sanitation. Such “community working
groups” as seen in Cuba were in charge of all aspects, from
designing plans, voicing community concerns, and evaluat-
ing results [22].This highlights how communities can become
self-sufficient—yet they will need some initial direction to
build capacity [23].This capacity buildingmay come from the
private sector or the government if the context allows.
4.2.2. Improving Intersectoral Coordination. Consistent with
dengue guidelines, a “Multisectoral Dengue Action Com-
mittee” should meet regularly, collaborating with sanitation
services and government heads of environment to improve
water supply [1]. Officials should liaisewith nongovernmental
organisations (NGOs)working in vector-borne diseases, such
as malaria, to incorporate dengue into their programmes.
4.2.3. Role of the Media. Themedia played an important part
in the outbreak response. Using themedia for health commu-
nication has many benefits; it can be participatory and driven
by the local context and culture allowing community mem-
bers to be seen as equal [24]. For example, the reach of a mass
media family planning campaign increased to 75% when
indirect effects (spread of information through the commu-
nity) were considered [25]. Mass media messages can have
extensive impact in Nepal and should be built upon further.
4.3. Limitations of the Study. One limitation of the sampling
methodologywas not includingmore community leaders and
members and FCHVs involved with the response. However,
the sample included key stakeholders and policy makers
in the government and the district. It was not possible to
accurately determine the number of doctors involved in the
dengue response; however the doctors from four hospitals
that dealt with 81% of recorded cases were included (EDCD
unpublished data 2010).
“Social desirability” of the participants was a limitation.
The respondents may have been less willing to criticise
themselves or their institutions in order to show themselves in
the best light, according to social acceptability norms. Several
times participants did not wish to comment about the
Ministry of Health activities, reducing reliability of results.
Regional research and activities
- Virus serotyping, entomological surveys, 
training sessions
Grassroots
- Awareness programme more widespread
- Vector control in more districts
The problem: dengue 
outbreak in a fragile state
Improve links to 
private 
healthcare 
sector, improve 
case reporting 
system
Figure 2: Realistic solutions to dengue: regional collaboration and
community participation. Also need to improve case reporting
system.
The role of the participant was not deemed to have
induced any additional bias to results. The researcher was
trained in qualitative research techniques to reduce introduc-
ing bias.
This research is not transferable to all other settings where
dengue outbreaks are seen, such as wealthier countries or
those with high dengue endemicity. However, this research
provides a good insight into challenges dealingwith emerging
infectious diseases within a fragile political context.
5. Conclusion
It is difficult to run a disease surveillance system in a post-
conflict environment with reduced access to care and no
consistent use of national case classification, particularly in a
country like Nepal, where dengue has recently emerged. The
political context can affect the financial and trained human
resources available to combat dengue. Furthermore, low
levels of endemicity require different strategies for dengue
surveillance [16]. Future studies for the implementation of
dengue surveillance and control programmes need to take
into account the political context as well as the level of
endemicity.
Country-specific packages for dengue outbreak response
are neededwhich recognise realistic solutions that are achiev-
able in the short term (Figure 2). Two key solutions involve
the following:
(1) using regional assistance to improve research into
the vectors and spatial distribution of serotypes as
well as to provide training for healthcare and public
health professionals; regional efforts are advocated by
many countries for improved vector control, includ-
ing those with a strong political infrastructure, such
as Singapore [26];
(2) building upon good community mobilisation and
improving awareness; potential strategies include
FCHVhelp with primary care case notification, wider
participation in vector control activities, and the
quick mobilisation of community response teams.
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Alongside this, the need for the integration of a case
reporting system in the private sector must be addressed as a
priority. With good intersectoral and regional collaboration,
community empowerment, and access to reliable diagnostic
facilities, major dengue outbreaks can be prevented.
Conflict of Interests
The authors have no conflict of interests.
Acknowledgments
The authors acknowledge the support of the Ministry of
Health in Nepal and PHIDReC. Special thanks to Rekha
Thapa for help with translation and facilitating data collec-
tion.
References
[1] WHO and TDR, Dengue Guidelines for Diagnosis, Treatment,
Prevention and Control, WHO, Geneva, Switzerland, 2009.
[2] J. D. Clemens, “Evaluating diagnostics: dengue,”Nature Reviews
Microbiology, vol. 8, supplement 12, p. S1, 2010.
[3] M. G. Guzman, S. B. Halstead, H. Artsob et al., “Dengue: a
continuing global threat,” Nature Reviews Microbiology, vol. 8,
supplement 12, pp. S7–S16, 2010.
[4] E. E. Ooi and D. J. Gubler, “Global spread of epidemic dengue:
the influence of environmental change,” Future Virology, vol. 4,
no. 6, pp. 571–580, 2009.
[5] B. Kay and V. S. Nam, “New strategy against Aedes aegypti in
Vietnam,”The Lancet, vol. 365, no. 9459, pp. 613–617, 2005.
[6] B. D. Pandey, K. Morita, S. R. Khanal et al., “Dengue virus,
Nepal,” Emerging Infectious Diseases, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 514–515,
2008.
[7] WHO, “Dengue fever and dengue haemorrhagic fever pre-
vention and control,” in Proceedings of the 55th World Health
Assembly WHA55.17, Agenda item 13.14, May 2002.
[8] O. Horstick, S. Runge-Ranzinger,M. B. Nathan, andA. Kroeger,
“Dengue vector-control services: how do they work? A system-
atic literature review and country case studies,” Transactions of
the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, vol. 104, no.
6, pp. 379–386, 2010.
[9] The World Bank, “Definitions of Fragility and Conflict, 2009,”
2011, http://go.worldbank.org/NEK8GNPSO0.
[10] P. R. Shankar, “Attracting and retaining doctors in rural Nepal,”
Rural and Remote Health, vol. 10, no. 3, p. 1420, 2010.
[11] B. Devkota, “Effectiveness of essential health care services
delivery inNepal,” Journal of NepalHealth ResearchCouncil, vol.
6, no. 13, pp. 74–83, 2008.
[12] M. E. Beatty, A. Stone, D.W. Fitzsimons et al., “Best practices in
dengue surveillance: a report from the asia-pacific and americas
dengue prevention boards,” PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases,
vol. 4, no. 11, p. e890, 2010.
[13] S. Vong, V. Khieu, O. Glass et al., “Dengue incidence in urban
and rural cambodia: results from population-based active fever
surveillance, 2006–2008,” PLoS Neglected Tropical Diseases, vol.
4, no. 11, p. e903, 2010.
[14] O. Wichmann, I. K. Yoon, S. Vong et al., “Dengue in Thailand
and Cambodia: an assessment of the degree of underrecognized
disease burden based on reported cases,” PLoS Neglected Tropi-
cal Diseases, vol. 5, no. 3, p. e996, 2011.
[15] D. F. Pyle, L. M. Nath, B. L. Shrestha, A. Sharma, and S. Koirala,
“Assessment of early warning and reporting systems (EWARS)
in NEPAL,” Activitiy Report 126, 2004.
[16] S. Runge-Ranzinger, O. Horstick, M. Marx, and A. Kroeger,
“What does dengue disease surveillance contribute to predict-
ing and detecting outbreaks and describing trends?” Tropical
Medicine and International Health, vol. 13, no. 8, pp. 1022–1041,
2008.
[17] B. Devkota and E. Van Teijlingen, “Understanding effects of
armed conflict on health outcomes: the case of Nepal,” Conflict
and Health, vol. 4, no. 1, p. 20, 2010.
[18] J. Spiegel, S. Bennett, L. Hattersley et al., “Barriers and bridges
to prevention and control of dengue: the need for a social-
ecological approach,”EcoHealth, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 273–290, 2005.
[19] C. Glenton, I. B. Scheel, S. Pradhan, S. Lewin, S. Hodgins, andV.
Shrestha, “The female community health volunteer programme
in Nepal: decision makers’ perceptions of volunteerism, pay-
ment and other incentives,” Social Science andMedicine, vol. 70,
no. 12, pp. 1920–1927, 2010.
[20] C. Heintze,M. V. Garrido, andA. Kroeger, “What do communi-
ty-based dengue control programmes achieve? A systematic
review of published evaluations,” Transactions of the Royal Soci-
ety of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, vol. 101, no. 4, pp. 317–325,
2007.
[21] V. S. Nam, N. T. Yen, T. V. Phong et al., “Elimination of den-
gue by community programs using Mesocyclops (copepoda)
against Aedes aegypti in central Vietnam,” American Journal of
Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, vol. 72, no. 1, pp. 67–73, 2005.
[22] M. E. Toledo Romani, V. Vanlerberghe, D. Perez et al., “Achiev-
ing sustainability of community-based dengue control in San-
tiago de Cuba,” Social Science and Medicine, vol. 64, no. 4, pp.
976–988, 2007.
[23] M. Gibbon, R. Labonte, and G. Laverack, “Evaluating commu-
nity capacity,”Health and Social Care in the Community, vol. 10,
no. 6, pp. 485–491, 2002.
[24] M. J. Dutta and I. Basnyat, “The radio communication project
in Nepal: a culture-centered approach to participation,” Health
Education and Behavior, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 442–454, 2008.
[25] M. Boulay, J. D. Storey, and S. Sood, “Indirect exposure to a
family planning mass media campaign in Nepal,” Journal of
health communication, vol. 7, no. 5, pp. 379–399, 2002.
[26] E. E. Ooi, K. T. Goh, and D. J. Gubler, “Dengue prevention
and 35 years of vector control in Singapore,” Emerging Infectious
Diseases, vol. 12, no. 6, pp. 887–893, 2006.
